ERC Consolidator Grant IMEDMC

Information and Misinformation Economics:
Design, Manipulations and Countermeasures

The Project

Information structures shape the possible outcomes of strategic interactions as agents learn from, and respond to the signals they receive. Often, however, agents can also respond to the conditions of information production before any information is even generated. When their interests are at stakes, agents may try to interfere with the production of information, or preemptively change the underlying reality for fear of what might be revealed. For example, reporting on the practices of firms may lead them both to opt for cleaner production processes or engage in greenwashing. The IMEDMC project seeks to advance our understanding of the effect of information structures in situations where agents respond both before and after information is produced.

The Team

Everyone who contributed to the research in this project.

  • Victor Augias. Victor received his PhD in economics from Sciences Po in 2023. He works on information design, mechanism design and behavioral economics. He is now a postdoc at Bonn University. Here is his website.

  • Daniel M. A. Barreto. Daniel received his PhD in economics from Sciences Po in 2023. He works on information economics, behavioral economics and political economics. He is now an assistant professor at the University of Anmsterdam. Here is his website.

  • Jacopo Bizzotto. Jacopo is an Associate Professor at Oslo Business School, OsloMet. His research uses microeconomic theory to study how information is generated and shared in markets. Here is his website.

  • Alexis Ghersengorin. Alexis received his PhD from the Paris School of Ecoomics in 2022. He works on information design and communication, decision theory and behavioral economics. He worked with us at Science Po on the IMEDMC project in 2021-2023. He is now a postdoc at Oxford university. Here is his website.

  • Emeric Henry. Emeric is a Professor at Sciences Po. He is a microeconomist using theory, experimental and empirical methods to study questions in law and economics. Here is his website.

  • Eduardo Perez-Richet. Eduardo is a Professor at Sciences Po and the recipient of an ERC consolidator grant for the IMEDMC project. He works on microeconomic theory, game theory, information economics and political economics. Here is his website.

  • Aurélien Salas. Aurélien is a second year PhD student at Sciences Po working on the economics of platforms.

  • Vasiliki Skreta. Vasiliki is a Professor at UT Austin and at UCL. She is a microeconomic theorist working primarily on mechanism design. Here is her website.

  • Adrien Vigier. Adrien is a Professor at the University of Nottingham. One part of his current work lies at the intersection of mechanism design and information design, and the other part in finance. Here is his website.

The Research

Area 1: Disinformation

We study models of strategic disinformation by an agent seeking to influence the beliefs and actions of a heterogeneous population of receivers by broadcasting and spreading false news.

Area 2: Testing, Allocation and Selection under costly state manipulations

We study the optimal design of tests, allocation mechanisms or selection rules when transfers are not available to mediate transactions and the designer must rely on a manipulable measure of the characteristics of candidates.

Area 3: Delegated information design

We study optimal contracts for delegated information design: the principal must rely on an agent to design or implement some dimensions of her informational policy, but can only contract on the actions undertaken by some third party at the receiving end of the informational process.

Area 4: State Modification

We study the optimal design of tests, allocation mechanisms or selection rules when candidates can respond to the mechanism by investing in their type.

Area 5: Market segmentation

We study the optimal segmentation of monopolistic markets under different objectives such as: a social planner with redistributive concerns, or a platform trading off the incentives of consumers to enter the platform, and its share of the profits of monopolistic sellers.